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MARX AND THE DOMINATION OF NATURE1 
Alienation, Technology and Communism
Abstract
This paper adresses a problem which seems to be remote from 
marxist theory: the domination of nature in modern 
capitalist societies. It attempts to show that the concepts 
human nature, technology, and alienation form the key 
concepts for such an analysis. It thus takes a clear 
standpoint against an orthodox interpretation of Marx, be it 
concerned with class-theory, accumulation process or the 
exclusively "structural" aspects of his work. It is not Marx 
as Political Economist, but Marx as a philosopher and social 
scientist who is of interest here. Furthermore, the paper 
attempts to show how these key concepts are linked to Marx's 
communist perspective. It will be asked if this part of his 
theory is a viable one especially in the light of some 
recent criticisms. Marx as a critic of capitalism derives 
his critique not only from his analysis that capitalism is 
ultimately inefficient but also that it is inhuman. This 
ethical orientation is encapsulated in his theory of human 
nature. It will be argued that this ethical dimension 
prefigures Marx's model of a communist society. Thus Marx's 
theory of human nature and communism are inseparably linked 
together. The paper falls into two parts. The first deals 
with problems connected to Marx's theory of human nature and 
alienation; the second part deals with problems connected to 
the project of communism. In the conclusion I will make some 
short remarks about Marx's stance between enlightenment and 
romanticism.
Introduction
Marx claims, that man's production in every society is above 
all self-creation ("Selbsterzeugung", "Vergegenstandlichung 
seiner Wesenskraft”) and the transformation of outward
1. I would like to thank Iring Fetscher, Maurizio Viroli 
and Werner Maihofer for their comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. I am especially indebted, 




























































































nature (Stoffwechsel). In order to do so, man has always 
used tools as mediators between himself and nature. In 
analyzing capitalist society Marx shifts the attention to 
the industrial work-process, commodity production, value and 
surplus-value creation, to machines, division of labour and 
the process towards automation. I shall restrict my argument 
to those aspects of the problem which concern the metabolism 
man-nature and leave aside the aspects of value
9production. Whilst I restrict my analysis to the use-value 
aspects, this is not to say that there are not other ways to 
look at the problem - one could mention, for instance, the 
orthodox interpretation of Marx which concentrates on the 
aspects of capital and surplus-value production, the 
accumulation process, class-interests and class-struggle 
etc. In this perspective it is the market economy with its 
profit-mechanism which inevitably leads to the destruction 
of nature; once this is replaced by the principle of state­
planning, the roots of the problem will be eliminated. I 
admit that this claim can be derived from Marx's own 
analysis - we might call it the 'standard interpretation'. 
However, it will be shown that this standard-interpretation 
neglects an other important method of argumentation in Marx. 
The standard interpretation relies mainly upon the 
catergories of marxist Political Economy, to which the *




























































































labour-theory of value is central.3 Even granted that this 
theorem is not defective or that it can be reformulated in 
such a way, I do not think that we can reach illuminating 
insights on its basis with respect to ecological problems. 
Consequently, this paper tries to employ a more philosophi­
cally inspired approach. As we shall see, the influence of 
Hegel4 5and Feuerbach"* is of decisive importance here.
The guiding thread of my discussion consists of the 
following elements of Marx's theory: (a) the relation 
between man and man; (b) the relation between man and 
nature, which is possible only via mediation: man masters 
nature by means of (c) labour. Since Marx excludes all forms 
of "Robinsonades" from his analysis, the process of 
production is social, i.e. the relations of man-nature 
correspond to a relation man-man and a division of labour. 
Or, in other words: the relation man-nature is a relation
3. The criticisms of this theorem are uncountable. For a 
- contemporary critique of this theorem see Morishima
(1973), Steedman (1977), and Roemer (1985).
4. There are different accounts for Hegel's influence on 
Marx. The importance is stressed by Lukacs (1923), 
Marcuse (1941), Avineri (1968), Fetscher (1985); it 
is denied or played down by Althusser (1970), Della 
Volpe (1950) and Colletti (1976). See Anderson (1976) 
for a good account.
5. For an account of Feuerbach's influence on Marx see 





























































































society-nature. Connected with the concept of labour we get 
the concept of (d) "dead labour": tools, machinery, 
technology. Because (under certain conditions) man's own 
products appear to him as alien powers, we obtain (e) the 
alienation of man. Because the relations between men (under 































































































First of all, it seems useful to make a conceptual 
clarification.
How can we understand the concept of "Domination of nature", 
a concept which since the time of the Renaissance5 has 
acquired more and more importance in scientific, 
philosophical and political discourse?
To be sure, Marx was a follower of Bacon and Descartes who 
hold that man by means of his scientific knowledge of the 
laws of nature may become 'maître et possesseur de la 
nature'. But Marx is aware of the problem of 
anthropomorphizing nature, as implied in the very term 67
6. Cf. W. Leiss (1972:36)
7. Cf. Grundrisse:705, Capital 1:390 for the master 
aspect. In regard to the aspect of possessing nature, 
Marx in Capital 3 makes the following statement:
"From the standpoint of a higher economic form of 
society, private ownership of the globe by single 
individuals will appear quite as absurd as private 
ownership of one man by another. Even a whole 
society, a nation, or even all simultaneously 
existing societies taken together, are not the owners 
of the globe. They are only its possessors, its 
usufructuaries, and, like boni patres familias, they 





























































































"domination of nature" (a problem which did not trouble many
Qauthors before him) :
"Basically the appropriation of animals, land 
etc. cannot take place in a master-servant 
relation, although the animal provides 
service. The presupposition of the master- 
servant relation is the appropriation of an 
alien will■" (Grundrisse:500, my emph.)
How, then does Marx define man's relation to nature, if 
there is no alien will to be broken? The answer may seem
very trivial at first sight. He defines the relation of man
gand nature as a dialectical one where man/nature is the 
subject/object. On the one side man is part of nature, his 
Stoffwechsel with nature is part of natural transformation, 
his labour is part of natural energy; on the other side man 
transforms nature in accordance with his own needs, "he 
opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces, setting 
in motion ... the natural forces of his body, in order to 
appropriate nature's productions in a form adapted to his 
own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing 
it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops 
his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience 
to his sway." (Capital 1:177) 8*
8. Descartes himself had no reason to trouble himself in 
using this metaphor, since nature for him was 
essentially a spiritless machine.




























































































"Domination of nature" hence does not mean the breaking of 
an alien will but the (practical) appropriation of nature 
according to man's wants.10 Since human beings have the 
capacity to reflect and to act in a conscious way, they 
develop also a theoretical relation to nature, science being 
the modern expression of it.
The practical and theoretical aspects converge in the notion 
of technology which is, according.to Marx, science applied 
to the industrial process.11 But it is also the active
10. It seems to me that Marx used two notions for 
analyzing man's relation to nature: domination and 
property; cf. GR:706 where Marx speaks of man's 
"mastery over nature" and his "participation in 
nature". The first notion refers to the development 
of science, technology and industry, the second to 
pre-class societies. Here*Marx uses the term property 
to analyze the relation man/nature in the following 
way: "Property thus originally means no more than a 
human being's relation to his natural conditions of 
production as belonging to him, as his, as 
presupposed along with his own being; relations to 
them as natural presuppositions of his self, which 
only form, so to speak, his extended body." (GR:491) 
Things change as soon as the conditions of production 
are no longer presupposed, but the result of previous 
transformations.
11. "The principle which it pursued, of resolving each 
process into its constituent movements, without any 
regard to their possible execution by the hand of 
man, created the new modern science of technology.
The varied, apparently unconnected, and petrified 
forms of the industrial processes now resolved 
themselves into so many conscious and systematic 
applications of natural science to the attainment of 




























































































relationship of man to nature. The first is characteristic 
for the epoch of modern industry, the latter is characteris­
tic for the human condition in general. The more man 
succeeds in transforming nature by means of technology, the 
more
nature becomes purely an object for humankind, 
purely a matter of utility; ceases to be 
recognised as a power for itself; and the 
theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws 
appears merely as the ruse so as to subjugate 
it under human needs, whether as an object of 
consumption or a means of production.
(Grundrisse:410)
12
In the tradition of Enlightenment philosophy Marx shared 
belief in the possibilities of science and technology. We 
shall see if he underestimated the possible side-effeccs 
which result from an ever wider and accelerated use of 
technology.
According to Marx, capitalism displays a decisive feature - 
fast development of the productive forces, which he 
sometimes described as a trend towards automation. 
Intentionally or not, technologies were developed by mankind 12
12. "Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with
nature." (Capital 1:372) "Die Technologie enthiillt 
das aktive Verhalten des Menschen zur Natur..." 
(Kapital 1:393)
"But just as man requires lungs to breathe with, so 
he requires something that is work of man's hand, in 





























































































to increase the degree of domination over nature, to produce 
more goods in the same time unit, in Marx's words: to reduce 
the necessary labour13, to develop man's needs and pleasures 
and the possibilities of fulfilling them. As a result, 
however, this means may become an end in itself: technology 
masters man rather than vice versa. As we shall see there 
are three main alienating causes which are of special 
interest here: the conditions of private property, "dead 
labour" and the division of labour, to each of which I shall 
turn below. Jon Elster has given a definition of alienation 
which grasps the sociologically important features of the 
concept and which I shall use as a first approximation to 
the problem:
Men are alienated ... from the aggregate 
result of their activities when (i) they do 
not realize that the aggregates are the result 
of their own activities and (ii) they are 
unable to control or to change the outcome...
It should be empasized that even when (i) does 
not obtain, (ii) may be true. Men may well 
know that their own social environment is the 
product of their own behaviour, and yet be 
unable to control it. This can happen if they 
know that but not how their actions generate 
the aggregate features that they deplore. This 
is not a trivial insight." (Elster, 1985: 100- 
1)
This feature of modern societies becomes dramatic when man
13. As Steinvorth (1977) has shown, it is possible to 





























































































has at his disposal14 technical means and possibilities to 
change nature in ever shorter time limits and also in an 
irreversible manner.
Human Nature at the Centre
If we talk about alienation, a "true" human being which then 
becomes alienated is always presupposed. This reference 
point, which is of logical necessity, is present in Marx's 
work too. It has to be identified in his theory of human 
nature.15 As Norman Geras in a most detained and convincing 
study has shown, Marx throughout his writings adhered to 
such a thing as "human nature". To support this claim, he 
makes over a hundred references to Marx's works. I shall 
repeat only a few of them. In the Holy Family of 1844 Marx 
accuses Bruno Bauer of sublimating "all that affirms a 
finite material existence outside self-consciousness. What 
he combats ... is ... nature; nature both as it exists 
outside man and as man's nature." (CW 4: 141) In the German 
Ideology of 1845 Marx criticises Christianity: "The only
14. This phrase should not be taken at face value; as 
will become clear below, this process has to be 
understood rather as a result of unintended 
consequences than as the conscious result of human 
agency
15. A recent critique of Marx's philosophical 





























































































reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the 
domination of the flesh and 'desires as a driving force' was 
because it regarded our flesh, our desires as something 
foreign to us; it wanted to free us from determination by 
nature only because it regarded our own nature as not 
belonging to us." (CW 5: 62) In the Grundrisse of 1857 he 
speaks of wealth, stripped of its bourgeois form, as the 
"full development of human mastery over the forces of 
nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's 
own nature." And he links this to "the absolute working-out 
of [man's] creative potentialities", which "makes this 
totality of development, ie. the development of all human 
powers as such the end in itself." (Grundrisse:488) In 
Capital 1 he polemicizes against Bentham and his principle 
of utility, and concludes: "... he that would judge all 
human acts, movements, relations, etc. according to the 
principle of utility would first have to deal with human 
nature in general, and then with human nature as 
historically modified in each epoch. Bentham does not 
trouble himself with this. With the dryest naivite he 
assumes that the modern petty bourgeois, especially the 
English petty bourgeois, is the normal man." (cited in 
Geras:79-80).
Finally, in Capital 3 Marx, distinguishing the realm of 
freedom from that of necessity, writes: "Freedom in this 




























































































consist in socialized man, the associated producers, 
rationally regulating their interchange with nature, 
bringing it under their common control instead of being 
ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving 
this with the least expenditure of energy and under 
conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human 
nature." (C 3:800) The evidence that Marx holds a specific 
view of human nature seems clear and abundant. And yet, one 
interpretation of Marx, namely the one of Althusser and his 
followers, has denied exactly this. The main candidate for a 
rebuttal of this 'humanistic' element in Marx is the sixth 
Thesis on Feuerbach, the second and third sentences of which 
read as follows: "But the essence of man is no abstraction 
inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the 
ensemble of the social relations." As Geras shows, however, 
this can by no means be taken as support for the 'anti­
humanist' interpretation of Marx. I do not want to go into 
more detail here, much less a textual analysis, since Geras 
has made the case clear enough (see Geras 1983: 27-87) Up to 
now we have listed a number of statements on human nature 
which are explanatory in character. Additionally, Marx 
employs the concept in a normative sense1®. He not only 16
16. For a distinction between the terms "normative",
"ethical", "evaluative" and "practical" see Williams 
(1983:135). For my purpose it is sufficient to get 
the distinction between "explanatory" and its 




























































































holds that there exists something like a human nature, but, 
moreover, he qualifies this. The substantial part of his 
concept of human nature is contained in his notion of labour 
as free, creative activity. In the Paris Manuscripts he 
distinguishes men from animals by defining their species 
character:
Free conscious activity is man's species 
character... The animal is immediately 
identical with its life-activity... Man makes 
his life-activity itself the object of his 
will and consciousness... Conscious life- 
activity directly distinguishes man from 
animal life-activity...Admittedly animals also 
produce. They build themselves nests, 
dwellings... But man in the working up of the 
objective world... duplicates himself not 
only, as in consciousness, intellectually but 
also actively, in reality, and therefore he 
contemplates himself in a world he has 
created. (CW 3: 275-7)
But human beings are not only creative, but also communal. 
"The individual is the social being. His manifestations of 
life - even if they may not appear in the direct form of 
communal manifestations of life carried out in association 
with others - are therefore an expression and confirmation 
of social life." (CW 3:299)
(Footnote continued from previous page)





























































































Marx saw clearly that the present conditions of production 
(capitalist relations) impinge upon the full realization of 
these human characteristics. The abolition of these 
conditions would thus give rise to the realization of all 
human powers.
17This "expressivist" notion of labour is present xn all
18stages of Marx's theoretical development. Just as German 
Idealism saw the formation of spirit as self-consciousness, 
Marx as a materialist "praxis-philosopher" sees the 
formation of human species as self-creation:
externalisation, objectification and appropriation are the
19three aspects of this circle. In this context we have the 
human labour on one side and the objectified, dead labour on 
the other. The latter is the crystallized result of man's 
interchange with nature. How does Marx define the relation 
between the two? Does a place for normative content exist in 1789
17. See Ch. Taylor (1975), also Lukes (1973: 71) who, 
however, does not use the term "expressivist"
18. Thus Marx's normative level has been discussed under 
the label of "humanism". For the normative dimension
of the younger Marx there already exists a vast
literature, cf. von Magnis (1975). That a normative 
dimension is present as well in the work of the late 
Marx could even be accepted by the "anti-humanist" 
interpretation; but it can not accept the claim that 






























































































this model? In the remainder of this paper it will be shown, 
that this question is a crucial one for Marx's analysis.
The division of Labour
This is an important concept in Marx's work which has been 
little discussed. It has so many facets that one always has 
to keep in mind carefully which one is employed when he 
refers to the concept.
For analytical purposes we might generally distinguish 
between the following six forms of division of labour: 1. 
spatial (geographical, intra- and international) 2. sexual, 
3. social-functional, 4. occupational, 5. technical, and 5. 
economic. Marx's terminology, however, is completely 
different. Usually he discusses the concept always within 
following dichotomies: town/country, industry/agriculture, 
mental/manual, society/factory. Some commentators have 
claimed that it was Marx's aim to abolish the division of 
labour, a claim which is - at least not in that general 
manner - supported by the texts.
To understand what follows it should be remarked that I take 
Marx's concept of division of labour to have four global 
dimensions which underlie all his analysis of historical 




























































































derived on the one hand by his distinction of division of 
labour within society/within factory and on the other hand 
by his use of the concept in an evaluative and explanatory 
way.
Note, first, his claim in the early writings that the 
abolition of private property would be synonymous with the 
abolition of the division of labour. The core of this
position was the identification of private property
20relations with the division of labour. It was given up in 
the later works. (In this sense Marx indeed aimed at an 
abolition of the divsion of labour).
A less obvious case is the abolition of occupational
division of labour and division of labour within society. In
the German Ideology Marx confronts a society of occupational
division of labour with a communist society,
where nobody has one exclusive sphere of 
activity but each can become accomplished in 
any branch he wishes, society regulates the 
general production and thus makes it possible 
for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the 
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, 
without ever becoming hunter, fisherman,




























































































shepard or critic.21 (CW 5:47)
And, more explicitly.
In a communist society there are no painters 
but at most people who engage in painting 
among other activities." (CW 5: 394)
According to this outline, occupational division of labour 
would be abolished. But note that Marx assumes "different 
branches" to exist in a communist society, retaining a 
functional division of labour on a societal level. Marx's 
main preoccupation was the merging of functional, 
occupational or technical roles and tasks with one class, so 
that fragmentation of individuals would be linked up with a 
class separation. Thus I interpret Marx's position in the 
German Ideology as allowing for functional division of 
labour in society (indicated by "different branches", see 
above), if individuals are free to change from one function 
to another.22
21. Cf. the lucid comment cf Selucky: "Any farmer can 
afford to organise his life according to the 
suggested pattern even in present-day society." 
(1979:10)
22. To be sure, this interpretation runs against the 
common view which sees the German Ideology as an 
example for a position which wanted to abolish the 
division of labour tout court. Admittedly, my 
interpretation is based only on the hint of 
"different branches". But viewing this passage in the 
German Ideology from the more developed standpoint of 
his later writings, we may regard the German Ideology




























































































Capital recognizes the importance of (4=occupational),
23(5=technical) and (6=economic). The division of labour 
inside the factory can also be expressed with the term 
"division of tasks" which is equivalent to (5) in the above 
typology. In Capital Marx speaks of the "abolition of the 
old division of labour" (Capital 1:488) which may suggest 
that Marx wanted to maintain a certain division of labour. 
As we shall see, much depends on the interpretation of this 
phrase, for Marx's use of the term 'division of labour' 
varies in different contexts and different periods of his 
work. As I said, Marx's main interest was to reduce the 
fragmentary effects of the division of labour and, as a 
prerequisite therefore, the exploration of the possibility. 
Marx opposed strongly a life-long subordination of 
individuals to specialised tasks in all of his works; in 
other words, he opposed a fusion of (4) and (5). The 
division of labour within society is, however, a broader 
concept than the division of tasks: the occupational 
division of labour is only one part of the social division 
of labour.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
as a "germ", leading to the more elaborate stance in 
Capital, rather than an opposing view.
23. Marx does not regard geographical and sexual division 




























































































The following figure may help to clarify the different 
levels and meanings of the concept division of labour:




























































































In Capital Marx speaks of the division of labour in general, 
in particular, and in detail. (C 1:351) We can identify the 
different types of division of labour in Figure 1 (Since 
Marx here examines the division of labour in the sphere of 
production, he pays no attention to the upper part of the 
figure).
From the context in which the statement in Capital occurs 
("abolition of the old division of labour"), it is clear 
that it is meant to refer to the division of labour inside 
the factory. Marx wanted to abolish the "detail-worker of 
today, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same 
task..." (Capital 1:458), In other words, he advocated a
separation between functions and professions, between the
2 4technical and the occupational dimension.
The distinction between division of labour within society 
and division of labour within the factory is stressed by 
Marx:
While division of labour in society at 
large... is common to economic formations of 
society the most diverse, division of labour 
in the workshop, as practised by manufacture, 
is a special creation of the capitalist mode 
of production alone. Capital 1:359)
24. Note, that a division at this point would lead to a 




























































































This supports my interpretation that Marx wanted to abolish 
the division of labour within the factory but maintain it 
for society as a whole. As Fetscher put it, Marx in his 
mature works "no longer pretends that the division of labour 
will alltogether disappear. Certainly there will be 
different social functions and people to fill them... 
{Fetscher 1973:461)25
I now turn to the evaluative dimension of Marx's discourse. 
In his early writings the concept of division of labour is 
almost completely normative, i.e. the division of labour is 
a bad thing which must be abolished. Ricoeur convincingly 
argued that in the German Ideology the concept of 'division 
of labour' has the same function as 'alienation' in the 
Paris Manuscripts. (1986:84)
The Poverty of Philosophy may be regarded as a turning point: 
where Marx partly continues his evaluative approach, 
approvingly citing Adam Smith that different abilities of
25. See also Moore (1980:41) for the same view. This
interpretation is further supported by the following 
statement: "...fully developed individual... to whom 
the different social functions he performs, are but 
so many modes of gicving free scope to his own and 
acquired powers." (Capital 1:488, my emph.); cf. also 
Critique of the Gotha Programme: "(W]hat social 
functions will remain in existence [in communist 
society] that are analogous to present state 





























































































persons were not so much the cause but the effect of the 
division of labour: "A porter differs less from a 
philosopher than a mastiff from a greyhound. It is the 
division of labour which has set a gulf between them." (CW 
6:180)26
But on the other hand Marx in this text approaches economic 
concepts (in opposition to Proudhon) in a historical and 
explanatory way. Thus he stresses the fact that general 
concepts like division of labour may cover many different 
things which which do not have much in common and thus can 
hardly be understood by the term "divide" (cf. CW 6:180)
It is interesting to see to what degree The Poverty of
Philosophy anticipates the discussion of Capital. With
respect to the fragmentation of man and the tendency towards
its abolition Marx takes the same position in both works. In
the Poverty Marx states:
"With the introduction of machinery the 
division of labour inside society has
26. But Marx is not consistent here. A few pages later he 
speaks of the "separation of the different parts of 
labour, leaving to each one the opportunity of 
devoting himself to the speciality best suited to 
him..." (CW 6:183, my emph.) This is also the 
position adopted in the later works; it appears under 
the label of 'natural' division of labour which Marx 
takes to be present in every social formation, i.e. 
division of labour based on sex, age, personal 





























































































increased, the task of the worker inside the 
workshop has been simplified... the human 
being has been further fragmented." (CW 6:188, 
amended transl.)
In Capital we read:
[T]he detail-worker of today, crippled by 
life-long repetition of one and the same 
trivial operation, and thus reduced to a mere 
fragment of a man... [will be replaced] by the 
fully developed individual..." (C 1: 458, L&W)
In the Poverty we read that a trend toward universality
arises, "the tendency towards an integral development of the
individual begins to be felt." (CW 6:190) In Capital Marx
gives the reason for this development:
Modern industry through its catastrophes 
imposes the necessity of recognizing, as a 
fundamental law of production, variation of 
work, consequently the fitness of the labourer 
for varied work, consequently the greatest 
possible development of his varied aptitudes.
(C 1, L&W:4 58)
The meaning of this passage is not only that because 
'fitness for varied work' is functional for capitalism it is 
realised. It is also a statement about every modern 
industrial society, not only in its capitalist form. As 
Fetscher observed, "the very nature of modern industrial 
production and the rapid change of its technology will 
demand more many-sided indivduals..." (Fetscher 1973:461)
This overview has shown how closely the evaluative and 




























































































division of labour and Modern Industry. When Marx ridicules 
Proudhon who tried to distinguish the "good sides" and "bad 
sides" of an economic category, one should not forget that 
Marx's own approach was not completely alien to this. He 
does not, however, as Proudhon, favour a return to the 
medieval masterpiece where every worker would produce all 
parts of a certain product (CW 6:190); rather he favours a 
solution beyond the factory, a solution on the basis of 
automation which allows for a post-medieval universality. 
But, nevertheless, the common interest of both lies in the 
abolition of fragmentation of man. Marx's abolition is a 
"Aufhebung", in the famous triple sense of the word 
(abolition, preservation, lifting up).
Still another evaluative outline we find in the Grundrisse. 
Here Marx stresses the beneficial consequences of the 
division of labour for the prospects of mankind. This 
judgement is based on the the important contribution of 
division of labour for the development of the productive 
forces. In one passage Marx attributes to the division of 
labour the role of the 'driving force' of historical 
dynamics which in the end will lead to the supersession of 
capitalism, (cf. Grundrisse:159) The negative evaluation of 
this process is shifted to what we might call 
'powerlessness' of the individuals. It refers to the fact




























































































relations which exist independently of them. (cf.
Grundrisse:157) and which are alien to them. (cf. id.)
Individuals are subsumed under social 
production; social production exists outside 
them as their fate; but social production is 
not subsumed under individuals, manageable by 
them as their common wealth." (Grundrisse:158)
We may conclude from this that Marx would allow for a
certain social division of labour, as far as it is the
2 8product of the associated individuals.
If we follow Ricoeur in his interpretation that the term 
"division of labour" partly plays the role of the term 
"alienation" (Ricoeur 1986:84), this may offer us the 
possibility of distinguishing between the different ways in 
which Marx uses the concept. We then can conclude that 
whenever Marx spoke of the abolition of the division of 
labour he meant the abolition of alienation (or, more 
precisely: the abolition of the alienating effects of the 
division of labour). Whenever he speaks 'neutrally' or even 
positively of the division of labour he takes it to be (1) a 278
27
27. As we shall see below, this is the essence of Marx's 
critique of capitalism, a critique which informs his 
view of a communist society.
28. Selucky in his (otherwise illuminating) treatment of 
the division of labour is thus mistaken when he says: 
"Be that as it may, Marx and Engels wanted to abolish 




























































































necessary stage in the development of mankind and its 
29productive powers , or even,
(2) a necessary condition for every economic formation, for 
each society.30
I take the following passage from the Kritik des Gothaer 
Programms as covering both the social division of labour and 
the division of tasks (= inside the factory):
In a higher stage of communist society, after 
the enslaving subordination of the individual 
to the division of labour, and therewith also 
the antithesis between mental and physical 
labour has vanished..." (SW 3:19)
If we read this passage as referring to the division of 
tasks, there arise no problems of interpretation. It is then 
the same statement as in Capital and refers to point 
(4=occupational) of my typology.
If we read this passage as referring to the social division 
of labour, we have two possible interpretations: (a) Marx 
wanted the abolition of the division of labour (because of 
its enslaving effects) (b) Marx wanted the abolition of the
29.
30.





























































































enslavinq effects of the division of labour but the 
maintenance of the division of labour in general.
(a) would make sense for (1) - (3) in the typology: 
international, sexual and social division of labour are 
possible candidates to bring about 'enslaving effects'.
(b) would mean to establish a social division of labour 
which has no ’enslaving effects'.
Reading the passage in the line of the above passage from
the Grundrisse we might derive additionally
(b '): Not all division of labour creates an enslaving
subordination;
and
(b11): mental and manual do not form an antithesis if they 
are not crystallised into fixed occupations.
If we summarize the main difference between the early and 
late Marx in this respect we can say that the later Marx31 
(partly) comes to acknowledge the necessity of a social 
division of labour which is realised according to functional 
requirements rather than according to class positions. In
Leaving aside the possible reading that already the 






























































































one word: Marx opposed a division of labour where certain 
(negative) features of labour are merged with one class, 
whereas certain other (positive) features are merged with 
another class; but Marx was in favour of a division of 
labour where necessary functions of society were separated 
I made the reservation "partly", because he was not very 
clear about the maintenance of specific social 
differentiations (politics, law, state etc.)
Marx in fact did envisage a new kind of division of labour 
which at least for the technical and economic sphere was 
brought about by capitalism itself, by its revolutionizing 
tendency regarding its own technical base - and hence the 
creation of new professions, new branches of production and 
the abolition of life-long professions.
In this historical perspective Marx expects the modern 
industry of capitalism to fulfill the important task of 
demystifying the production process and to set up the 
preconditions for an all-around development of the 
individuals :
Modern Industry rent the veil that concealed 
from men their own social process of produc­
tion and that turned the various, spontaneous­
ly divided branches of production into so many 
riddles, not only to outsiders, but even to 
the initiated. The principle which is pursued, 
of resolving each process into its constituent 
movements, without any regard to their pos­
sible execution by the hand of man, created 
the new modern science of technology. The 
varied, apparently unconnected, and petrified 




























































































themselves into so many conscious and sys­
tematic applications of natural science to the 
attainment of given useful effects. (Capital 
1:485)-*X
In this outline Marx attributes the negative features to the
capitalist form, the positive ones to the revolutionary
technological basis of capitalism which finally develops
also human individuals:
Modern industry through its catastrophes 
imposes the necessity of recognizing, as a 
fundamental law of production, variation of 
work, consequently the fitness of the labourer 
for varied work, consequently the greatest 
possible development of his varied aptitudes.
It becomes a question of life and death for 
society to adapt the mode of production to the 
normal functioning of this law. Modern 
Industry, indeed, compels society, under 
penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker 
of today, crippled by life-long repetition of 
one and the same trivial operation, and thus 
reduced to a mere fragment of a man, by the 
fully developed individual, fit for a variety 
of labours, ready to face any change of 
production, and to whom the different social 
functions he performs, are but so many modes 
of giving free scope to his own natural and 
acquired powers."(Capital I: 488, my emphasis) 32
32. There exists a passage in the Grundrisse where Marx 
takes this view to extremes:
"No longer does the worker insert a modified natural 
thing [Naturgegenstand] as middle link between the 
object [Objekt] and himself; rather, he inserts the 
process of nature, transformed into an industrial 
process, as a process between himself and inorganic 
nature, mastering it. He steps to the side of the 





























































































Marx opposes the result of the capitalist mode of production 
which reduces the worker to a mere fragment of man. Instead 
his ideal is the fully developed individual which gives 
"free scope to his own natural and acquired powers". As we 
have seen, this account of Marx's analysis does not fit into 
the straitjacket of an anti-humanist reading. Yet, further, 
it affirms the interpretation that in Marx's circular model 
of objectified and living labour a place for a normative 
content does exist and is essential for his analysis. Still 
another conclusion is to be drawn. As my discussion has 
shown, the notion "division of labour" is a rather complex 
subject in Marx; it covers many things which lead to 
confusion, if one does not distinguish very clearly between 
the different meanings. Marx himself made the same point 
against Proudhon: the term "division of labour" covers many 
different things which do not have much in common and thus 
can hardly be understood by the term "divide".33
From Alienation to Fetishism
Imagine now that the circle of objectification and 
appropriation is interrupted by an ecological crisis caused 
by human action upon nature. Marx is quite aware of this




























































































problem. In the last section of chapter 15 of the first 
volume of Capital he takes into consideration the 
possibility of an interruption of man's Stoffwechsel with 
nature.
All progress in capitalistic agriculture is a 
progress in the art, not only robbing the 
labourer, but of robbing the soil; all 
progress in increasing the fertility of the 
soil for a given time, is a progress towards 
ruining the lasting sources of that fertility. 
The more a country starts its development on 
the foundation of modern industry, like the 
United States, for example, the more rapid is 
the process of destruction. Capitalist 
production, therefore, develops technology, 
and the combining together of various 
processes into a social whole, only by sapping 
the original sources of all wealth - the soil 
and the.labourer." (Capital 1:506-7, my 
emph.)
And in Capital 3 he gives the following account of such an 
interruption:
Large-scale industry and large-scale mechani­
sed agriculture work together. If originally 
distinguished by the fact that the former lays 
waste and destroys principally labour power, 
hence the natural force of human beings, 
whereas the latter more directly exhausts the 
natural validity of the soil, they join hands 
in the further course of development in that 
the industrial system in the country-side also 
enervates the labourers, and industry and 
commerce on their part supply agriculture with 
the means of exhausting the soil." (C 3:813) 34
34. In an interesting comment to this passage, Fetscher 
suggests that Marx was deeply influenced by the 
biologist and agronom Fraas in recognizing the 





























































































In contemporary language such a state of affairs would be
3 5described as ecological crisis. Is this ecological crisis 
a result of capitalism or of technology? To this crucial 
question I want immediately add a related q u e s t i o n : i s  
alienation due to the economic structure of capitalism or is 
it the necessary result of the ever expanding and changing 
technological feature of production? These questions point 
to the heart of the problématique. The marxist tradition, 
not hesitating, has pointed to the capitalist relations of
production. No doubt, the quintessence of Marx's answer is 
37very much the same ; and yet there is something which does 
not match with that answer. In explaining this, I want to 
offer an interpretation which assumes that the term 
"alienation" in the early Marx later was substituted with 
the term "fetishism". In both cases we encounter a social 
feature which Marx considers to be detrimental to the 'good 
life', i.e. that the result of human action comes to exist 
as an 'external fate' (auBeres Verhângnis) against 
the individuals. (Cf. Grundrisse: 158) In both cases we 
encounter the lack of control of the individuals over the 356*
35. Note, however, that Marx's conceptual framework seems 
to allow only for the following two main features of 
ecological crisis: exhaustion of labour power and 
exhaustion of the soil.
36. I shall make clear below how the two are linked 
togehter




























































































relations in which they are placed. The notion of fetishism, 
furthermore, points to the fact that certain social 
relations acquire an apparent power, thus giving rise to the 
illusion that they are things. This prevents the individuals 
from seeing that their social relations are producing this 
'fate', or 'alien power' which dominates them.
Marx's conclusion in both cases was to change the social 
relations in such a way that transparency can be achieved. 
How does Marx, then, make use of the concepts of alienation 
and fetishism in his later writings?
The answer is that he employs a binary scheme in analysing 
the reproduction of capital: use-value and exchange-value, 
concrete and abstract labour and that he employs the concept
of alienation in analogy to Feuerbach's model of religious 
38alienation . Bearing this in mind, we can analyse both the 
value aspect (capital) and the use-value aspect (technology 38
38. Cf. Marx: "As, in religion, man is governed by the 
products of his brain, so in capitalist production, 
he is governed by the products of his own hand." 
(Capital 1:621)
As Elster put it:
"Perhaps the most central single theme in Marx's 
thinking, from the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts 
to Capital, is the idea that under capitalism the 
products of men gain an independent existence and 
come into opposition to their makers. Religion, the 





























































































in our case) with the concept of alienation. Feuerbach hold
that man projects all his good and divine characteristics
39onto God and remains thus the poor, mean man . What one
40side loses, the other gains. This "zero-sum-model" is 
repeated by Marx analysing (1) the relation of the worker to 
capital, but also analysing (2) the relation of the worker 
to technology and (3) the relation of technology to capital. 
We thus have the figure of the externalisation of human 
powers and abilities which get embodied in technology, which 
in its turn gets absorbed by capital. In (1) we have a 
transfer of value,39 401 in (2) we have a transfer of skill, and 
in (3) we have an inversion of reality. The circle is 
closed: capital can present itself as the creative 
mechanism, which automatically produces itself, technology, 
and the labour power. This is the mechanism which creates 
'capital fetish'. Let me provide the textual evidence for 
this.
(1) Transfer of value
39. See Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, cited in 
Tucker (1962:89) "The more empty life is, the fuller, 
the more concrete is God. The impoverishing of the 
real world and the enriching of God is one act."
40. A most obvious case of the zero-sum model is the 
division of the working day into social necessary and 
surplus labour
41. Which is at the same time a transfer of power: the 





























































































The labourer therefore produces material, 
objective wealth, but in the form of capital, 
of an alien power that dominates and exploits 
him. (Capital 1:571)
In the Grundrisse he speaks of "objectified labour as power
over living labour" (cf. Grundrisse: 542, 454 and passim)
(2) Transfer of skill
[T]he skill resides not in the worker but in 
the machine... The social spirit of labour 
obtains an objective existence separate from 
individual workers. (Grundrisse: 529 Fn)
[I]t is the machinery which posses skill and 
strength, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul 
of its own in the mechanical laws acting 
through it... The workers' activity, reduced 
to a mere abstraction of activity, is 
determined and regulated on all sides by the 
movement of machinery and not the opposite. 
(Grundrisse:693)
Along with the tool, the skill of the workman 
in handling it passes over to the machine. 
(Capital 1:420)
(3) Inversion of reality
The collective power of labour, its character 
as social labour, is therefore the collective 
power of capital. Likewise science... All 
social powers of production are productive 
powers of capital, and it appears as itself 
their subject. (Grundrisse:585)
The productive forces of social labour take 
the appearance of inherent.properties of 
capital... (Capital 1:607) 42
42. Cf also: "Die gesellschaftlichen Produktivkrâfte der 
Arbeit... Technologie... diese Entwicklung der 
Produktivkraft der vergesellschafteten Arbeit..., 
dies ailes stellt sich dar als Produktivkraft des 
Kapitals... Die Mystifikation... wird jetzt viel 





























































































The whole process is summarized as follows:
Thus, the specific mode of working here 
appears directly as becoming transferred from 
the worker to capital in the form of the 
machine, and his own labour capacity devalued 
thereby... What was the living worker's 
activity becomes the activity of the machine. 
Thus the appropriation of labour by capital 
confronts the worker in a coasely sensuous 
form: capital absorbs labour into itself -'als 
hatt' es Lieb' im Leibe' (Grundrisse:704)
Consider (2) in isolation from (1) and (3). If we allow for 
the possibility that this objectification always leads to 
alienation (and not only the capitalist use of it) we would 
have to accept alienation as part of the human condition.
If we return to the concept of fetishism in Marx, it may be 
said that it denotes generally disguised and concealed 
relations and the supersession of fetishism is tantamount to 
the establishment of transparent social relations. The 
concept itself derives from Portugese "feitico [lat. 
factitius] and means "artificial", "false" and "magic". It 
was first employed in ethnology, but also in philosophy 
(Schelling, Hegel, Kant), sociology (Comte), physics and 
psychoanalysis. It denotes the phenomenon that objects 
produced by people are invested with apparent power. 43
43. Cf. Hegel: "Der Verstand kommt zum BewuGtsein, daG
ein Zusammenhang besteht, aber die nahere Bestimmung 
ist ihm unbekannt." Vorlesunqen über die Philosophie 




























































































Objects do not have that power inherently, but the
attribution of power to them by their producers, creates on
44its own, apparent power. The fetish character of 
commodities arises, because their social character is 
established only after the production, after the use-values 
have entered exchange and proven their exchange-value. If 
labour is connected from the outset as social labour there 
can be no fetishism.4"’ Marx refers above all to commodity, 
money and capital fetishism; the first two he explains at 
the beginning of volume I of Capital, he returns to the 
third at several places throughout Capital, culminating in
the "Trinitarian formula" (Volume III). What happens if we
46apply the category of fetishism to technology?
Technological fetishism? 456
44. It would be interesting to discuss recent approaches 
in in epistemology ('constructivism') in respect to 
this problem
45. As we will see in the next section this point is 
crucial to Marx's perspective. If there is no social 
integration of labour from the outset, we get 
fetishism. Fetishism is a condition unworthy of human 
beings, to whom Marx wants to give back their power; 
power to control all natural and social relations. 
Thus he could never allow the market principle to 
become the dominating principle of social production.
46. I tried to disclose some hints of such an approach 
under (2) above. However, Marx cannot allow for an 





























































































IE we recall the distinctions from above (1. relation
worker/capital, 2. relation worker/technology, 3. relation
technology/capital), Marx assumes the suppression of (2) by
(3). Thus he dedicates little attention to (2). But this is
exactly the place where technological fetishism would arise:
The objectified, past labour thus becomes the 
dominator of the living, present labour. The 
relation between subject and object gets 
inverted. (MEGA II.3.1.:100, my translation)
Marx himself treats the machine as a fetish in situations
such as the following: "During the labour process the
products of former labour processes are brought back from
4 Bthe dead..." (MEGA II.3.1.:56, my transl.) Time and again 
he uses the phrase of "dead" labour, "spectre", "monster 
with a soul of its own", "demoniac power", culminating in 
this curious phrase:
Here we have, in the place of the isolated 
machine, a mechanical monster whose body fills 
whole factories, and whose demon power, at 
first veiled under the slow and measured 
motions of his giant limbs, at length breaks 
out into the fast and furious whirl of his 
countless working organs. (Capital 1:381-2) 478
47. "Die vergegenstandlichte vergangne Arbeit wird so zum 
Herrscher iiber die lebendige, gegenwartige Arbeit.
Das Verhaltnis von Subjekt und Objekt wird 
verkehrt."(MEGA 11.3.1:100)
48. "Im ArbeitsprozeB werden die Produkte des friiheren 





























































































This interregnum ("Zwischenreich") between dead and alive
astonished Marx, like it may astonish us. But Marx also
49gives another account of the machine. This time the evil
springs from the capitalist use of machinery:
It took both time and experience before the 
workpeople learnt to distinguish between 
machinery and its employment by capital, and 
to direct their attacks not against the mate­
rial instruments of production, but against 
the mode in which they are used. (Capital 1:
429)
It is now clear that the two questions from the beginning of 
the last section are linked together. Marx's answer to them 
seems to be a different one, depending on which machine 
definition is used. The crucial question is if the "demon's 
dance" is due to technology as such or if it is due to its 
capitalist use.
Marx made an implicit distinction between commodities, money 
and capital on the one hand and technology on the other; the 
former being variable (subsumed to social determination and
therefore change), the latter being constant: mankind's
50progress expresses itself in technological progess. Hence 4950
49. MacKenzie (1984:499) rightly notes that Marx 
equivocated on the crucial question of characterising 
the machine.
50. Later on the 'Frankfurt School' questioned this 
distinction. Horkheimer and Adorno revised the second 
assumption, arguing that modern science and 
technology do not provide any longer 'per se' the 
basis for a liberated society. Furthermore they




























































































it becomes clear that Marx could not allow for the concept 
of 'technological fetishism' for the simple reason that his 
historical outlook would have become completely pessimistic. 
He takes the alternative view, saying that capitalist 
relations are responsible for detrimental effects stemming 
from technology. Furthermore, he postulates the real 
possibility of controlling technology completely. In the 
Grundrisse Marx assumes that technology will always play the 
intermediating part between man and nature to an ever 
greater extent and that mankind will reach a nearly complete
(Footnote continued from previous page)
speculated about another kind of science and reason 
(Horkheimer/Adorno 1944); see also Benjamin (1942), 
Bloch (1955) and Marcuse (1957) who speculated about 
another relation between man and nature, even another 
concept of nature itself. They all in one form or 
another speculated about a 'resurrection of nature'. 
Habermas, on the contrary, rightly pointed out that 
their approach in turn was rather romantic than 
marxist (Habermas 1973:45) and argued for a revision 
of the first assumption saying that "jede moderne 
Gesellschaft, gleichviel wie ihre Klassenstruktur 
beschaffen ist, einen hohen Grad an struktureller 
Differenzierung aufweisen muB." He then charges Marx 
for not having recognised the "evolutionare 
Eigenwert, den mediengesteuerte Subsysteme besitzen." 
(Habermas 1981, vol.2:499,501) Marx was so 
preoccupied with the 'enslaving effects' of the 
division of labour that he tended to neglect the 
importance of structural differentiation of society. 
Habermas shares this concern; but he tries to 
preserve the evolutionary achievements on the level 
of social systems. He tries to prevent the spill-over 
of 'systemic imperatives' (enslaving effects!) from 




























































































mastery over nature 51 52(which implies mastery over technology 
and society as well). Since an ever smaller amount of living 
labour will be acquired in this automated and self- 
controlled society, man can step outside the production 
process and develop his artistic, scientific powers.
This means that the results of the Stoffwechsel with nature 
will be (a) intended, and (b) that there will be no 
unintended consequences. If (a) or (b) does not occur the 
consequence will be side-effects, repercussions from nature 
to society, ecological crises and the like. My thesis is 
that Marx, at least in the Grundrisse, presupposed (a) and 
(b) for communist society and that only under these
52conditions full mastery over nature would be possible.
But this optimistic view rests on the basic assumption that 
technology can be controlled completely by the individuals. 
Is this a valid assumption? I think it is not, for several 
reasons. First, recall Marx's definition of the machine. It
51. See Grundrisse:705. See also the following passage: 
"[T]he conquest of the forces of nature by the social 
intellect is the precondition of the productive power 
of the means of labour as developed into the 
automatic process..." (id.709)
52. Note, however, that a full-fledged control is a self- 
defeating concept, cf. Masuch (1987) because it would 





























































































is essentially an artifact which is based on the transfer of 
skill from the worker to a mechanism. A mechanism which 
expropriates the worker from his abilities constitutes, 
however, a situation of alienation.^ Second, Marx's 
assumption is inspired by the 19th century faith in the 
possibilities of science. He shared the illusion that 
natural sciences could achieve an 'absolute knowledge'. But 
with the experience of the last hundred years we may say 
that the 'opacity of nature' is by no means resolved into 
complete transparency (and it is doubtful if it will ever be 
possible). Third, the combination of technologies leads to a 
multiplication of the difficulties to control them.
This becomes a question of life and death if we consider 
technologies which involve or produce dangerous substances. 
As Perrow pointed out, some characteristics of high-risk 
technologies "suggest that no matter how effective 
conventional safety devices are, there is a form of accident 
that is inevitable." (Perrow 1984:3) This alarming 
conclusion is derived from the specific features of a part 
of modern technology: "[M]ost high-risk systems have some 
special characteristics, beyond their toxic or explosive or 
genetic dangers, that make accidents in them inevitable,
53. There may be a compensation if the possibility for 




























































































even 'normal'. This has to do with the way failures can 
interact and the way the system is tied together." (Perrow 
1984:4) This sort of system is characterised by 
'interactive complexity' and 'tight coupling'. If both taken 
together will inevitably produce an accident, this would be 
the case for a normal or systems accident in Perrows 
definition. As he makes clear, "we have such accidents 
because we have built an industrial society that has some 
parts, like industrial plants or military adventures, that 
have highly interactive and tightly coupled units. 
Unfortunately, some of these have high potential for 
catastrophic accidents." (Perrow 1984:8)
Let me introduce a thought experiment: imagine a 
technologically highly-developed and complex society without 
a capital-labour-relation, without "money" in the 
capitalistic sense, i.e. a society which produces in social 
cooperation, in this case we would not be able to observe 
what Marx called "capital fetishism", "commodity fetishism" 
and "money fetishism" - but we might find the phenomenon of 
technological fetishism. The sum total of social labour 
would follow criteria of efficiency, of rationality, of 




























































































interrelations always and necessarily transparent to the 
producers.54 Hence we would still have "normal accidents".
Let me then provide a tentative definition of what 
technological fetishism is. I think the definition should 
cover at least three phenomena: First, that the present 
structure of technology is the unintended consequence of 
human action; second that technology affects the life of 
everyone in a significant way; and third that its logic can 
be understood, if ever, only by a few specialists. We may 
generally distinguish between technology as 'single 
artifact' which is used in an instrumental way and the 
combination of technologies within a complex structure. An 
example for the first case is a tool or a single machine 
which was projected by engineers (and who are not astonished 
by the outcome). An example for the second case would be the 
introduction of new technology - which virtually (especially 
if it is a revolutionary technology) affects all spheres of 
society: economy, law, politics, education, ... and, 
finally, science and technology again, thus starting a new 
cycle.
54. This would be possible only under conditions of face- 
to-face relations, i.e. under conditions of community 
rather than society. Mediating institutions are of 
evil here; cf. Marx's plea for the transcendence of 
the state in the Jewish Question:31 and in the German 
Ideology : 46. Cf.also Gray (1982:76 passim), Lange 




























































































The modern transport system may illustrate the two examples: 
although many people do not know how exactly their car 
works, they are still able to use it; specialists on the 
other hand (engineers, mechanics), know the 'secrets' of the 
car. But they become laymen as regards the aggregate outcome 
of the modern traffic system. This aggregate outcome is 
unintended; it affects everyone in a significant way and 
constitutes a problem for society. It becomes a field of 
conflict and research involving many different social 
spheres such as medicine (car accidents, pollution), social 
science (traffic jams), politics (taxes, constructing of 
streets etc.), law (regulation of traffic and its effects), 
education (basic rules of survival), mass media 
(information), economy (occupation) etc.
Consider now the difference to the individual car driver who 
does not know the technology of his car, but is nevertheless 
able to use it. In case of malfunctioning a mechanic adjusts 
the car. In the case of the traffic system we do not have 
one subsystem which takes care of the whole thing in case of 
its malfunctioning. Any one sphere's attempt to overcome a 
specific problem connected to the traffic system has to use 
'outputs' from other spheres (which it then uses as 'input') 





























































































Socio-technological combinations, thus conceived, would be a 
"black box", constructed, in the last instance by man, but 
not open to him. This is to say that unintended consequences 
(beneficial or harmful) have to be taken into account.5’’ The 
Grundrisse's hope for getting technology (and thus: nature) 
under complete control must thus be regarded as an illusion. 
To put it another way: technology (and other forms of 
objectivations, i.e. social forms, institutions) and human 
development follow a different logic; although the first can 
be grasped as the result of man's objectification, it is 
possible that after a "take-off-period" the objectivations 
of human activity acquire an autonomy and gain a real 
existence of their own ("second nature").55 56This affects the
55. In regard to the beneficial functioning of 
institutions cf. the instructive passage in Bourdieu: 
"Thus the social world comes to be peopled with 
institutions which no one designed or wanted; those 
who are ostensibly 'in charge' cannot say, even with 
the advantage of hindsight, how 'the formula was 
found', and are themselves astonished that such 
institutions can exist as they do, so well adapted to 
ends which their founders never explicitly 
formulated." (Bourdieu 1981:311-2)
56. When we apply the notion of 'fetishism' to 
technology, this might be analogous to what in modern 
sociology is known as 'institutionalisation' (Berger 
and Luckmann) or 'emerging properties' (Buckley, 
Blau). As Blau put it: "Although complex social 
systems have their foundation in simpler ones, they 
have their own dynamics with emergent properties." 
(Blau 1964:125) Margret Archer commented: "The latter 
can arise at all levels from small-scale interaction 
upwards, although as scope grows they are 
increasingly distanced from everyday psychological




























































































very relation between man and his objectivations: it can no 
longer be a direct one, as in ancient societies, but 
mediated through and governed by imperatives which stem from 
the "Dingwelt", which man in turn can only affect with 
mediations (money, power, technology etc.) In this case 
conditions (a) and (b) will not be realistic ones.
As we have seen, the very notion of complete 'mastery over 
nature' is an unrealistic one. It would presuppose 'complete 
mastery over technology and society' (i.e. all social 
relations must be brought under control of the 'associated 
individuals' in order to achieve transparency and to avoid 
unintended consequences.)57
(Footnote continued from previous page)
dispositions but never ultimately detached from 
interaction. The highest orders of emergence are 
nothing more than the relations between the results 
of the results of interaction." (Archer 1985:80) 
Recall here Marx's definition of fetishism that 
social relations appear as relations between things. 
Modern sociological theory is aware of this 
mechanism, maintaining, however, that this appearance 
is no false illusion but expresses the real 
relations. And, what is more, the 'results of the 
results' cannot be designed and controlled by man in 
a direct way.
57. It is in this sense that Habermas spoke of the idle 
hope of Marx to bring back these objectivations into 




























































































Let us return again to the double question from the 
beginning of the last section. We have seen that Marx's 
assumptions about 'complete mastery over nature' are not 
convincing ones. The impact of technology will thus be 
decisive for communist society. Admittedly, I did not 
account for capitalist relations as causes for ecological 
crises; but as should have become clear by now, it is 
sufficient for my purpose to show that the orthodox marxist 
account falls short in explaining decisive features of 
present society, i.e. technological complexity and 
ecological problems arising out of it. If my account is 
valid, the consequences for Marx's theory of liberation are 
severe. Since technology is part of the human condition it 
cannot be superseded. It thus cannot be included into the 
alienating causes, otherwise Marx's distinction between 
"objectification" and "alienation" (first employed against 
Hegel and then against the economists of his time) would 
collapse. However, Marx's historical hope is grounded on 
this very distinction, his bold project of putting into 
practice a state of affairs which would enable mankind to 
objectify itself in a non alienated way. His world-view 
would have become completely pessimistic. It would not allow 
the perspective of overcoming a state of affairs in which 
the individual is suffering, in which it is alienated, in 





























































































Let us see what traits of communist society Marx has given. 
Since he often refused to do this job, there are not many 
passages we can base our judgement on. In his Comments on 
James Mill (1844) he connects a "human society" to the 
release of human nature:
A
Let us suppose that we had carried out 
production as human beings. Each of us would 
have in two ways affirmed himself and the 
other person. ...I would have directly 
confirmed and realized my true nature, my 
human nature, my communal nature. Our products 
would be so many mirrors in which we saw 
reflected our essential nature. (CW 3: 227-8)
Marx opposes production under capitalist relations with
'production as human beings'. Human beings are charcterised
as creative and communal beings. A society which enabled the
58release of all human powers would be 'the human society'.
In the German Ideology he qualifies the fettering instances 58
58. In the Paris Manuscripts Marx does not yet equate
this human society with communism: "Communism is the 
necessary form and the dynamic principle of the 
immediate future, but communism as such is not the 
goal of human development, the form of human 
society.” (CW 3:306) In his later writings he does 
not return to this possible difference; there he 





























































































(the "causes of misery" ), which prevent human nature from
actualising itself , putting stress on the conscious
subjugation of natural forces, transforming them into
products of mankind:
B Communism differs from all previous 
movements in that it overturns the basis of 
all earlier relations of production and 
intercourse, and for the first time 
consciously treats all naturally 
( "naturwiichsig") evolved premises as the 
creations of hitherto existing men, strips 
them of their natural character and subjugates 
them to the power of the united individuals.
(CW 5: 81, my emph.)
59
Note that Marx's analysis becomes more concrete here. He 
distinguishes between 'natural' (in the sense of 'given', 
'unchangeable', 'opaque') relations and relations which are 
the product of conscious human action.
In Capital the same idea reappears. Marx analyses even 
closer the conditions for the emergence of 'natural 
premises' and the possibility to treat them as the creations 
of 'hitherto existing men'. In so doing, he employs the 
Stoffwechsel concept to analyse the relation of society to 
nature and conceives of human development in the circle of 
externalization, objectification and appropriation. 59
59. In Capital 1 Marx approvingly cites the monk Ortes
from Venice, who said: "Instead of projecting useless 
systems for peoples' happiness, I shall limit myself 
to investigate in the causes of human misery." (Das 




























































































Appropriation would not only mean "aquisition", but the 
opposite of "alienation".60 To bring this about, private 
property needs to be abolished and labour has to be 
constituted as social labour from the outset.
C
Let us now picture ourselves, by way of 
change, a community of free individuals, 
carrying on their work with the means of 
production in common, in which the labour- 
power of all the different individals is 
consciously applied as the combined labour- 
power of the community. (Capital 1:78) The 
life-process of society which is based on the 
process of material production, does not strip 
off its mystical veil until it is treated as 
production by freely associated men, and is 
consciously regulated by them in accordance 
with a settled plan. (Capital 1:80, my emph.)
In the last two passages Marx envisages communism 
essentially as a stage of society in which the united 
individuals (freely associated men) act upon their material 
production and conceive their products as products of their 
own; not as products of nature, not as mystical products 
("natural character" and "mystical veil" are interchangeble 
in the two sequences - they fulfill the same function in his 
argument). In Capital he maintains that production must be 
"regulated in accordance with a settled plan", this can be 
interpreted here as a more concrete formulation of the 
German Ideology's "subjugation of human creations to the





























































































power of the united individuals." Communism will be the 
historical stage under which men for the first time 
supercede the natural character of the Stoffwechsel. Note 
that in each case (from A to C) social relations are 
considered to be completely transparent which is the 
precondition for the vanishing of fetishism (see part 1).
In Capital 3 Marx summarises several strands of his analysis 
into the following passage:
D
In fact, the realm of freedom begins only 
where labour which is determined by necessity 
and mundane considerations cease; thus in the 
very nature of things it lies beyond the the 
sphere of actual material production. Just as 
the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy 
his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so 
must civilized man, and he must do so in all 
social formations and under all possible modes 
of production. With his development this realm 
of physical necessity expands as a result of 
his wants; but, at the same time, the forces 
of production which satisfy these wants also 
increase. Freedom in this field can only 
consist in socialised man, the associate 
producers, rationally regulating their inter­
change with nature, bringing it under their 
common control, instead of being ruled by it 
as a blind power; and achieving this with the 
least expenditure of energy and under condi­
tions most favourable to, and worthy of, their 
human nature. But it nonetheless still remains 
a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that 
development of human energy which is an end in 
itself, the true realm of freedom, which, 
however, can blossom forth only with this 
realm of necessity as its basis. The short­





























































































This remarkable passage is a synthesis of: his Stoffwechsel 
concept, the possibilities of liberating mankind on the 
basis of technological progress, and a characterisation of 
communist society. It is very much in the same vein as the 
passages A-C, with one difference to be noted. In Capital 3 
he acknowledges that the Stoffwechsel man-nature will always 
be a necessary condition for the existence of mankind. This 
is the 'realm of necessity' in which labour cannot become 
'life's prime want'. The release of human powers will become 
possible only in the 'relam of freedom' where the 
'development of human energy' becomes an end in itself. Let 
us recall here the passage from the Grundrisse where Marx 
envisaged a 'complete mastery over nature', a society in 
which man can step aside the production process. In 
comparison to the Grundrisse his conclusion in Capital 3 is 
more modest, putting the stress on the conscious regulation 
of man's relation to nature and to his fellowmen. This 
weaker notion of the domination of nature seems to be more 
defensible, which does not mean that it is completely 
unproblematic, as we shall see in the next section.
Market and Plan
In this section I want to examine several authors who have 




























































































society according to Marx's theory. With one exception they 
are all sceptical regarding the feasibility of Marx's 
outline. Main objections are that communism is economically 
inefficient, that it may lead to political unfreedom, that 
some of its actualisations would be unrealistic and even 
undesirable.
According to Selucky, Marx sees three main factors opposing 
the establishment of communism: (a) scarcity; (b) division 
of labour; (c) private property. Since (a) and (b) cannot be 
overcome, Marx's conclusion was, says Selucky, to abolish 
(c). Even if Selucky's account is not adequate61, for the 
sake of the argument I shall discuss his criticism.
According to Selucky, then, Marx identified (wrongly) 
private property with one other characteristic which is not 
necessarily inherent in this concept: the claim that private 
property and the market are inseparably linked together.
61. Selucky's assumptions are not very convincing. As I 
have shown above, division of labour need not be an 
obstacle for the establishment of communism. The 
question of private property is posed to general by 
Selucky. It is true that Marx saw the abolishing of 
private property as the precondition for a classless 
society. By private property he means private 
ownership of the means of production. But Marx also 
clearly accepts individual property in socialist 
society which means property which cannot be used to 
exploit or dominate other individuals (Cf. Moore 




























































































From this it was a small step for Marx to conclude that the 
abolition of private property means also the abolition of 
the market. But why did Marx believe that the abolition of 
private property could eliminate the production of 
commodities and therewith also the market? The answer, says 
Selucky, has to be found in Capital 1: "Only such products
can become commodities with regard to each other, as a 
result from different kinds of labour, each kind being
carried on independently and for the account of private 
6 2individuals." Selucky comments:
"On the one hand, the independence (autonomy) 
of producers is here rightly recognized. On 
the other hand, the existence of commodities 
is linked to private individuals whose 
autonomous position stems from private 
property. The causal connection of an autonomy 
of producers with private property is both a 
methodological and theoretical error. It is a 
methodological error because it adds to one of 
the necessary preconditions of the market 
(autonomy of producers) its historically 
transient and therefore unnecessary form 
(private property). It is a theoretical error 
since the essence of the phenomenon (autonomy 
of producers) is not distinguished from the 
phenomen's appearence (private property)."
(Selucky 1979: 29-30)
This criticism is a forceful one if, and only if, Marx 
failed to distinguish between different forms of property 
and if he really linked private autonomy to private property 
- a question which I do not discuss here. But we can state 
without doubt that Marx's plea for direct allocation and *




























































































distribution (labour posited as social labour from the 
outset - "als gesellschaftliche gesetzt",63) in communism 
can be linked to his preference for community over society. 
This theoretical position, as we shall see in the next 
section, is open to objections, one of them formulated by 
Selucky. He argues that the mere abolition of the market is 
not a sufficient precondition for a more efficient 
functioning of socialist economies. "That is why the 
traditional Marxian concept of direct allocation and 
distribution as the exclusive and obligatory socialist 
alternative to the market cannot be accepted..." (Selucky 
1979: 48)
Freedom, necessity and the orchestra
Let us consider now a more optimistic position, a suggestion 
offered by G. Markus. He sees the "rift" in Marx between his 
'scientism' and 'romanticism' (cf. Taylor 1975) not as a
63. Cf. Grundrisse:172 where Marx contrasts capitalism 
and communism: " In the first case the social 
character of production is posited only post festum 
with the elevation of products to exchange values and 
the excghange of these exchange values. In the second 
case the social character of production is 
presupposed and participation in the world of 
products, in consumption, is not mediated by the 
exchange of mutually independent labours or products 




























































































weakness, but as a strength. Thus he interprets the Marxian 
distinction between the "realm of necessity" (N) and the 
"realm of freedom" (F) exactly in the perspective of this 
"rift": socialism would mean, according to Markus, the 
realization of an institutional separation between the 
technical conditions of the reproduction-process and the 
sphere of human creativity, a separation between technical 
and social spheres. (Markus 1980:48) The further existence 
of phenomena like fetishism would then come to an end and 
transparency could be achieved. Institutional separation 
would mean a division between communal self-determination of 
the associated producers on the one hand and the functions 
of a central board of economic management which tasks are 
exclusively technical on the other, (id.,48) Several 
arguments can be made which oppose this account. The first
point is the assumption of Markus that the 'social' and
54'technical' could be separated. I would maintain, on the 
contrary, that the two are intertwined ever more under 
modern conditions: there exists no technical dimension 
without a social one, not even if we apply the extreme 
formula of the Grundrisse where Marx gives the example of a 
fully automated production process. With the presupposition 
of a fully automated production we would cancel out (N) *
64. They are, according to Markus, closely connected in 
all forms of society up till now, but may be 




























































































almost completely - but not the social dimension of it: 
social control would be as important as today. This leads me 
to my second criticism. In speaking of the social dimension 
of (N) I oppose Markus' definition of (N) and (F) as 
technical and social realm.65 The distinction between (N) 
and (F) itself, however, is a very valuable one if we define 
it as a distinction between the realm of 'necessity and 
mundane considerations' ("Not und auflere Zweckmafiigkeit" in 
German) and the realm of self-realisation. With this 
defintion we have the social dimension in both realms.66
But what about the "communal self-determination of the 
associated producers" and the "functions of the central 
board" Markus spoke of?
According to Selucky, Marx believed that important 
functional differentiations of society (like economy and
65. Note that Markus makes a move from the distiction 
between reproduction process and human creativity to 
the distinction between technical and social spheres, 
conflating both. The first distinction is Marx's 
(Capital 3, cited in the previous section), the 
second is a 'creative' invention of Markus.
66. And here we have the possibility of giving another 
solution to the problem of technology and alienation. 
In (N) work is, as it were, essentially characterised 
as 'transfer of skill'. But the individuals get 
compensated in (F), acquiring new skills. This 
solution would not do away completely with 





























































































politics) could be reversed and fused together in a 
synthesis of community-life. To illustrate this, Marx made 
reference to the so-called orchestra-model (see Capital 
3:386-7). According to Selucky "the orchestra model is the 
general model for the cooperation in the classless community 
of free associates: ^  the combined labour and all combined 
social activities would not require rulers but just 
'conductors' who will co-ordinate individual workers 
involved in team jobs." (Selucky 1979:73) He charges Marx 
here with confusing a micro-system with a macro-system. This 
deficeny appears when we consider the crucial question of 
who is making the decisions. Selucky gives three possible 
models for decision-making: (a) the conductor, (b) the 
orchestra as a whole, (c) an outside committe. Thus the 
orchestra model can provide an alternative organisational 
model on the micro-level. But applied to the level of 
society, i.e. to the macro-level, it fails: "If applied to 
society as a whole, these questions are, unlike the 
technical essence of the orchestra's inner structure, of a 
political nature. And since the orchestra may be subject to 
all the three above mentioned systemic arrangements, the 
very orchestral model as the pattern for a non-compulsive *
The general model for capitalist production is the 





























































































complex co-operation of men fails to offer any guaranteed
6 8protection from coercive rule." (1979: 74)
Selucky rightly observes that the danger of totalitarianism 
arises here. It arises, above all, because Marx favoured the 
community model over the society model. It is his 
preoccupation with alienation which tempts him to cancel out 
important achievements of modernity, for example the 
institutional separation of economy and politics. It is not 
by accident that Marx undervalued the social differentiation 
of society into law, politcs, economy etc. The only general 
answer we may derive from his work is to abolish the 
'enslaving effects'; but he failed to see that the orchestra 
model, transposed to the macro-level, could produce 
'enslaving effects' as well. Selucky holds that to be 
realistic a political body ("hierarchy of bodies", as he 
calls it) must exist "as long as there is social division of 68
68. Selucky goes on to establish a close connection of 
this fact with the base-superstructure concept in 
Marx's theory. He concludes that one cannot accept 
the base-superstructure concept and simultaneously 
imagine a centralised, hierarichally organized 
economic subsystem coexisting with a pluralistic, 
horizontally organized self-governed political sub­
system: "In a society with command central planning 
there is no room for autonomous policy-making in the 
provinces, cities and villages." (Selucky, 1979:78) 
It is not clear to me if Selucky would see this 
opposition also as a logical contradiction if the 
base/superstructure concept is given up, viz.why 
should it be impossible to have a mixture of 




























































































labour and scarcity... deciding about conflicting priorities 
and, consequently, about conflicts of interests." (Selucky 
1979:79)
Consider now a second possible criticism of Marx's communist 
outline. The 'conflicts of interests' is the central problem 
here. One possible solution to this problem is the political 
body with its binding decisions. But also the market is a 
candidate to solve this problem, as the following shows. 
According to Marx's concept of human nature, man should 
work (1) creatively and (2) communally. Dimensions (1) and 
(2) may come, however, into opposition to each other. David 
Miller has commented on this tension: "Unless we assume that 
the needs of producers and consumers dovetail perfectly, 
these two requirements are in tension with one another. In 
deciding what to produce, should I give precedence to my own 
creative impulses, or to others' needs as I perceive them?" 
(Miller 1987: 1 8 6 ) . Miller concludes from this, some sort 
of exchange system or market to be inevitable (he favours a 
model of 'market socialism'). "In the absence of an exchange 
system, there is no readily available standard of value that 
would enable each person to measure his productive 69
69. See already Niebuhr (1932): "[T]here can never be a 
perfect mutuality of interests between individuals 





























































































contribution.. . Thus there is no possibility of norms 
emerging that would indicate the value of the work each 
person must perform to discharge his social obligations." 
(Miller 1987:196)
At this point I apply again the distinction between (N) and 
(F) saying that both Selucky and Miller miss a central point 
in the argument of Marx, namely the distinction between 
socially necessary and surplus labour. If we interpret the
first as the realm of necessity (N), the second as the realm 
70of freedom (F), we can say the following: In (N) 
individuals are confronted with the eternal necessity of 
transforming outside nature to reproduce their lives which 
may even be done with a hierarchical organization [but which 
must not contradict (F)]. In (F) the kind of conflicts 
Selucky (economy and politics) and Miller (comparing the 
products of each other's work) envisage, simply can not 
exist. Here labour becomes life's prime want, self- 
creativity etc. without being submissed to economic 
rationality and hence not being subject to an exchange 
rationale. The character of labour is defined differently 70
70. However, not the full amount of surplus could be the 
basis for this realm, since also a communist society 
needs funds (surplus) to replace and evetually extend 
means of production, to foster new needs and develop 
new powers, to provide health service and education, 





























































































according to both. In (F) it is essentially free activity,
self-realization; in (N) it is always forced upon the
71producers, in all societies. They become "dominated by the 
pressure of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, 
and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a social duty." 
This passage from the Theories on Surplus Value is cited by 
Lukes who sees this as the heart of the matter, "the key to 
Marx's conception of 'real' freedom" which means 
"emancipation from the pressure of 'extraneous purposes', 
from what is regarded as a natural necessity or a social 
duty." (Lukes 1985:89) I think that this interpretation
identifies correctly the reason why Marx condemned 
72capitalism. But it should be emphasized that Marx 
distinguished between alienated social duties on the one 71
71. See Marx's discussion of Smith's and Fourier's
concept of labour in the Grundrisse where he tries to 
maintain a middle position between the two: labour 
neither as 'oath' nor as 'play'. When G.A. Cohen 
speculates about the possibility that some necessary 
labour in communism might be enjoyable, he seems to 
refer to the possibility mentioned by Marx, namely 
that labour might get changed into "travail 
attractif" (see Grundrisse:611; in contrast, in 
Capital the distinction between (N) and (F) is more 
strict) Cohen quite rightly thinks that necessary 
functions may be fulfilled in a pleasant way. He 
gives the example: "Some eating is enjoyable"(cf. 
Cohen 1978:324-5). If it is possible to do something 
necessary in an enjoyable way, we could introduce 
some elements of (F) into (N), a possibility which 
seems to have been largely excluded in Capital: self- 
realisation takes place mainly in the realm of 
freedom.




























































































hand and natural necessities on the other. The first should 
be abolished and transformed into 'authentic purposes' (or 
whatever formula one likes; the transformation of labour 
into a commodity was surely an evil for Marx) ; the second 
cannot be overcome completely (the degree of successful 
domination of nature determines its degree). In this respect 
the famous statement from the third volume of Capital is of 
great importance, since here Marx exactly acknowledges the 
"necessity and mundane considerations" (in German: "Not 
und auflere ZweckmaBigkeit") also in a communist society.
When Lukes asks: "And are there not natural necessities 
which human activity (including labour) must fulfil as a 
prerequisite of social cooperation in general and ... of a 
complex modern order in particular?" (ibid) Marx's answer 
was affirmative. To be sure, Marx held the view that 
'natural necessities' will be reduced more and more, 
depending on the level of development of the productive 
forces. He could not see, however, that a complex modern 
order has produced new restrictions which stem form the 
autonomy of social spheres vis-a-vis the individuals. The 
"Sachzwang" of the working of social institutions may be 
equated here with social duties (alienated or not) which 
leave little space for radical change: they ("only") can be 
transformed (into non- or less alienated ones) but not 
abolished, if they are functional necessary for modern 




























































































I now come to a critique of Marx's concept of human nature 
which has been put forward by G.A. Cohen. He questions both 
the possibility and the desirability of Marx's "total
7 3individuals" (we are thus dealing with problems of [F]). 
Starting from a comparison between Hegel and Marx he charges 
Marx with having abandoned a most valuable element of Hegel: 
human's need of self-definition, of identity. From this 
basic flaw follows Marx's blindness in regard to national, 
racial or religious conflicts which "generate, or at least 
sustain, ethnic and other bonds whose strength Marxists 
systematically undervalue, because they neglect the need for 
self identity underlying them." (Cohen 1983:235) This 
undervaluation of self-definition can also be located in 
Marx's ideal of work as the release of all powers inherent 
in man, thus escaping location within a social role. As Marx 
said in the German Ideology: "In a communist society there 
are no painters but at most people who engage in painting 
among other activities." (CW 5: 394) Cohen comments: "A 
society in which everyone is free to develop in any 
direction is not the same as a society in which anyone is 
able to develop in every direction: that kind of society 73
73. I shall consider only the problem of the possibility 





























































































will never be, because there will never be people with that 
order of ability." (Cohen 1983:237)74 According to my 
distinction above, Cohen's sort of conflicts would take 
place mainly in (F) which is tantamount to the statement 
that in (F) we will have also scarcity - albeit the scarcity 
of the human species.75 76How can we respond to that?
First, obviously, there is not much textual evidence for the 
view that Marx also saw scarcity as an enduring feature of 
history, because communism, among other things, would bring 
abundance of (at least) material wealth.75 But one could 
also derive a more pessimist view from Marx's own outline, 
because of the very character of human needs, which develop 
all the time, thus creating always new limits of satisfiable
74. Or, in Selucky's words: "One can hardly invent 
computers in the morning, perform neurosurgery in the 
afternoon, repair a jet in the evening and conduct a 
symphonic orchestra after dinner without becoming 
respectively computer engineer, neurosurgeon, jet- 
mechnic and conductor." (1979:10-1) But everyone can, 
according to Andy Warhol, become famous for 15 
minutes in his life.
75. Cf. also Elster: "Different forms of self-realisation 
are unequally demanding by way of material support. 
Torch sculptors need more than cooks, film directors 
more than chess players." (1985:524)
76. Cf. Critique of the Gotha Program: "... and all the 
springs of co-operative wealth flow more 
abundantly..." (SW 3:19). Cf. also Grundrisse: 325 





























































































77needs, hence scarcity. Second, and more important, the 
late Marx held a more moderate view regarding the 
possibilities of human development. Cohen is mistaken 
regarding the textual basis: everything he cites refers to 
the division of labour in Marx's early works. However, the 
extreme formula from the German Ideology ("fishing and
hunting") does not reappear in Capital, nor in the
78optimistic Grundrisse. As we have seen, Marx holds social
functions to be indispensable for communist society. Thus 
when Marx speaks of the "development of all human powers", 
the "absolute working out of his creative potentialities" 
(Grundrisse:488) he does not refute that individuals adapt 
to certain roles for a certain period in their life, and he 
does not say that each and every individual will be able to 
work out all of his creative potentialities, nor that he 
should. Marx's main concern was to explore the possibilities 
for an abolition of the fragmenting effects of the division
77. Cf. Capital 3: "With [civilized man's] development 
[the] realm of physical necessity expands as a result 
of his wants..." (799). For a systematic treatment of 
this problem see Hirsch (1976).
78. Here we read about the "free development of 
individualities... the general reduction of the 
necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then 
corresponds to the artistic, scientific, etc. 
development of the individuals in the time set free, 





























































































of labour; he consequently advocates the free development of
the individualities. But, when Lukes asks,
[W]hat does 'the free development of 
individualities' for all mean? That all should 
have an equal opportunity to develop whatever 
manifold capacities... they severally have? Or 
that all would in fact realize such capaci­
ties... Or does it mean that a maximum level 
of 'artistic, scientific etc. development' 
will be achieved in 'society' as a whole?
(Lukes 1985:90)
Marx does not offer a solution to these questions. What he 
based his outline upon, was that capitalism already 
developed human powers (but crippling them at the same
79time), that capitalism already abolished life-long roles 
(but petryfied the role of wage-labour, the division of 
mental and manual work). Marx assumed that communism would 
continue on this road (but abolish the negative traits 
mentioned). As early as in the German Ideology we find the 
following outline:
Thus things have come now to such a pass that 
the individuals must appropriate the existing 
totality of productive forces, not only to 
achieve self-activity [ Selbstbetatigung,
R.G.D, but, also, merely to safeguard their 
very existence... The appropriation of these 
forces is itself nothing more than the 
development of the individual capacities 
corresponding to the material instruments of 
production ... Only at this stage does self­
activity coincide with material life which 
corresponds to the development of individuals
79. See the French worker who returned from San
Francisco, reporting that he had exercised a number 
of professions which he previously would never have 




























































































into complete individuals [Totale Individuen,
R.G.] and the casting off of all natural 
limitations... With the appropriation of the 
total productive forces by the united 
individuals, private property comes to an 
end." (CW 5: 87-8, my emphasis)
In Capital 1 Marx says that the division of labour in the 
factory will be changed in the sense that a division of 
tasks remains, but that these tasks are not forced upon 
individuals in life-long occupations. Therefore individuals 
must be trained in an allround manner (by means of 
polytechnic education) to secure the double effect of (a) 
avoiding the life-long adaption to one professional role and 
(b) overcoming of the split between manual and mental 
labour. Of course, all of this applies only to (N). Here 
it is not necessary to answer the questions of Cohen, since 
Marx was content with the assertion that not each and every 
individual must be able to perform all tasks. Rather it is
the 'general intellect’ (Grundrisse) 'Gesamtarbeiter'
81(Capital 1:508-9) which is important here.
80. See Capital 1:488, see also Critique of the Gotha 
Programme, SW 3:19
81. "Intelligence in production expands in one direction, 
because it vanishes in many others. What is lost by 
the detail labourers, is concentrated in capital that 
employs them." (Capital 1:361) If the 'Gesamtarbei­
ter' succeeds in appropriating this result again (by 
expropriating capital), alienation will vanish - but 
a division of tasks will persist. This division of




























































































Cohen, however accepts the political powerful use which can 
be made out of Marx's human nature concept, supporting 
Elster's argument. Elster suggested that the following 
interpretation would make good sense of Marx's thoughts on 
this matter:
It is quite possible for technical progress 
during the later stage of capitalism to be 
both increasing and lower than it would have 
been under a socialist regime starting at the 
same technical level." (Elster, 1983: 217)
This being so, because in Marx's view, "innovative and 
creative activity is natural for man and springs from the 
inner sources of his being. Contrary to the usual approach 
in political economy, the problem is not one of creating the 
incentives to innovate, but of removing the obstacles to the 
natural innovative drive of the individual." (Elster 1983: 
216) This, however, does not fit well with the account 
Miller has given above. Miller thinks that since individuals 
hiterto have been forced to develop their needs, powers and 
productive forces, they might not develop them under 
communism. Thus he derives an essentially conservative trait 
within communist society and concludes: "'Human nature' is 
not a sufficient guarantor of progess." (Miller 1987:198) It 
is, indeed, true that Marx did not provide an explicit
(Footnote continued from previous page)





























































































feedback-mechanism from (F) to (N) which would be necessary 
to develop the productive forces. He only states that a 
person in communism (which, above all, has more free time to 
develop its powers and needs) coming from (F) enters (N) as
a new, different, richer person and thus affects social
8 2production significantly. Furthermore, Marx himself shows
8 3how mankind was forced to develop productive forces. On 
this account it is doubtful if we can rely on this rather 
speculative affirmation of 'human nature'. Furthermore, it 
would mean a politically impotent position for the 
supporters of communism.
But is this account valid at all? Let us discuss Miller's 
problem again with my distinction between (N) and (F). In 
(N) we have fully or partly automated production. The 
producers have to deal with necessity and mundane 
considerations. They are, as it were, forced to develop 
production. As Marx put it: "But it ... still remains a 
realm of necessity.” (Capital 3:799) But they do this 
according to a settled plan, they control conditions of the
82. See Grundrisse:712
83. Cohen, very much in the same vein as Miller, 
juxtaposes Marx's anthropology with his theory of 
history: in the first people are by nature creative 
beings, they produce in the condition of freedom 
conferred by material plenty; in the second they do 
not produce freely but because they have to. Cohen 
asks if the two are in contradiction with each other 





























































































process consciously. Since they are forced also in communism 
to transform nature, to invent and develop productive 
forces, I cannot see how the development of mankind tends to 
stagnate because human beings would not develop innovative 
capacities enough. Miller's argument seems to presuppose a 
society in which (f) has driven out (N) completely.
Conclusion: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism
From what we have analysed so far, one result springs 
immediately to the mind: the twofold judgement of essential 
features of capitalist society. They are condemned insofar 
they cripple human individuals, they are praised insofar 
they develop the possibilities for a communist future. Thus 
Marx's ethical foundation (i.e. his philosophical
anthropology) and his historical outline are in tension with
84one another under present conditions. They are compatible, 
and what is more, essentially the same in communist society. 
Here the latter is the fulfilment of the former, human 
essence being freed for the first time from all obstacles to 
its self-fulfilment. But under present conditions this 
tension has to be recognised. It has been expressed with the 
phrase that the progress of mankind is possible only on the





























































































backs of individuals, what 'man' gains, men lose. Marx 
himself was fond of the foilwing Goethe poem which he cited 
several times:
Sollte diese Qual uns qualen, 
da sie unsre Lust vermehrt; 
hat nicht Myriaden Seelen 
Timurs Herrschaft aufgezehrt?
QThis finalistic conception Marx took over from Hegel , 
according to whom it is the necessary return of Spirit 
(Geist) to itself which re-unifies the division of the 
world. Marx transposes Geist to man (as 'species being, 
Gattungswesen) and arrives at the historical scheme that 
mankind first lived in primordial harmony, then became 
fragmented (alienated) and finally will be re-unified again. 
Capitalism is the historical stage which precedes the final 
solution. In this stage the contradictions are carried to 
extremes. But with the growth of the problems the potential 
for their solution grows as well.
As the previous discussion has shown there are some reasons 
to conclude otherwise than Marx did. It may be that it is 

































































































- 7 4 -
but also the complex structure of modern society, technology
O Qbeing part of it. Furthermore, we may say that a complete 
abolition of alienation and fragmentation cannot be 
expected. What can be expected is the reduction of enslaving 
effects to the greatest possible degree.
Loewy (1981) interprets the position of Marx as one which 
combines the critical impact of revolutionary romanticism 
with the civilizing force of enlightenment, technology and 
capitalism. Thus Marx often gives twofold judgements on some 
decisive features of capitalism. One example was the 
division of labour; another was that "dead labour” (i.e. 
capital) gains the losses of the living labour, but also has 
a positive side in that it "presents itself historically as 
a progess and as a necessary phase in the economic 
development of society." (Capital 1:344)
At first glance there can be no doubt that Marx was more on 
the side of enlightenment and its enthusiasm for science, as 
the following statement, reported by Wilhelm Liebknecht, 
shows:
Soon we were on the field of Natural Science,
and Marx ridiculed the victorious reaction in
88. Note that even if the social sciences could do away 
with the 'opacity' of society, this would 
nevertheless remain a knowledge of experts. However, 
Marx assumed a "withering away of the social 




























































































Europe that fancied it had smothered the 
revolution and did not suspect that Natural 
Science was preparing a new revolution. That 
King Steam who had revolutionised the world in 
the last century had ceased to rule, and that 
into his place a far graeter revolutionist 
would step, the electric spark. And now Marx, 
all flushed and excited told me that during 
the last few days the model of an electric 
engine drawing a railroad train was on 
exhibition in Regent Street. 'Now the problem 
is solved - the consequences are indefinable. 
In the wake of the economic revolution the 
political must necessarily follow...(Cited in 
Selucky 1979:219)
But on the other hand Marx acknowledges the romantic
standpoint as a legitimate criticism of capitalism:
In earlier stages of development the single 
individual seems to be developed more fully, 
because he has not yet worked out his 
relationships in their fullness, or erected 
them as independent social powers and 
relations opposite himself. It is as 
ridiculous to yearn for a return to that 
original fullness as it is to believe that 
with this complete emptiness history has yet 
come to a standstill... The bourgeois 
viewpoint has never advanced beyond this 
antithesis between itself and this romantic 
viewpoint, and therefore the latter will 
accompany it as legitimate antithesis up to_q 
its blessed end. (Grundrisse:162, my emph.)
89. In the Communist Manifesto we find an even more
positive judgement regarding the Utopian Socialists: 
"But these socialist and communst publications 
contain also a critcal element. They attack every 
principle of existing society. Hence they are full of 
the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of 




























































































Charles Taylor concluded from this ambiguity that Marx
wanted to reach the goals of romanticism with the means of
scientific enlightenment. To cite Taylor:
What we see from the young to the mature Marx 
is not a change of view but a shift of 
emphasis within what to him must have appeared 
as fundamentally the same position. In the 
climate of the late nineteenth century it was 
naturally the dimension of 'scientific 
socialism' which tended to predominate...
Later commentators have been right to point 
out the rift between Marx's expressivism and 
his scientism. But this is not a difference 
between the young and the mature Marx. Rather 
his inability to see this rift was already 
implicit in his original position, in the 
transposition onto man of Hegel's self- 
positing 'Geist'. (Taylor 1975: 552)
When Marx envisages the reduction of the working day to a 
minimum which would facilitate the individuals' artistic and 
scientific education, he combines these two elements which 
are crucial to his image of human nature and which have been 
divided in the history of mankind. We may illustrate the two 
strands with Schiller and Saint-Simon. Schiller's favoured 
candidate for universalizing human values, for bringing 
harmony to society was art, because "all other forms of 
imagination [Vorstellung] divide society in referring only 
to the differences between man and man. Only the aesthetic 
communication [ schone Mitteilung] unifies the society, 
because it refers to things common to everyone." (cited in 




























































































Saint Simon, in contrast, attributes this role to science.
As he wrote in his "Letter from an Inhabitant of Geneva”: 
[TJhere is but one interest common to the whole of humanity, 
the progress of the sciences." (1952:9)
The shortening of the working day is the conditio sine qua 
non for either of the two prospects. It is, according to 
Marx, made possible by means of science and technlogy, but 
not set into practice due to capitalist relations. And here 
we come to Marx's reductionism "in the last instance":
He held the view that the puzzling strands of modern society 
run together in the institution of private property. Once 
this has been abolished, the "riddle of history" will have 
been solved. In addition to the objections above I want to 
add the following:
(i) there are alienating effects in modern society which do 
not stem from private property. Marx himself was aware of 
religion and the state (see Sister 1985:100). But, as we saw 
above, Marx could not have included technology.
(ii) it is doubtful if a single point in society exists, 
where all main problems/contradictions crystallize;
(iii) it is doubtful that in the absence of a 'center of 
society', these alienating effects can be superseded by 
conscious human action. Social complexity may constitute a 




























































































The main conclusion of this essay is then, that Marx's 
reduction of all problems to the concept of capitalist 
production is an insufficient one; but his theory also 
provides a kind of 'corrective' to this: in his concern 
about the 'enslaving effects' of all kinds of 
objectifications. It is this element of his theory which has 
proven to be the inspiring source for almost every modern 
critical enterprise. It is the categorical imperative which 
informed his own life-long efforts: "The criticism of 
religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest 
being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to
overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved,
90forsaken, despicable being."
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